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Abstract
The Gini coeﬃcient or index is perhaps one of the most used indicators of social and economic
conditions. In this paper we characterize the Gini index as the unique function that satisfies
the properties of scale invariance, symmetry, proportionality and convexity in similar rankings.
Furthermore, we discuss a simpler way to compute it.
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1 Introduction
In this article we oﬀer an original and novel characterization, based on the characterization of the
contour lines generated by the Gini index on simplex sets, which represent all possible income distri-
butions, when we impose an axiom of scale invariance on any numeric function that aspires to be an
inequality index. In the case of three individuals, these contour lines are hexagons whose edges are
line segments on distribution sets that maintain a similar order (see Foster and Sen (1997)); there are
six orders among individuals, this leads six flat parts on any contour line of the Gini index. The basic
idea is to define appropriate axioms that reflect this fact in the general case. The treatment of extreme
points of subsets of distributions that maintain the same income ordering is essential. If we ask that
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the index has a certain value in these extreme points, we can use it as a basis to extend the index to
the interior by assuming a principle of restricted linearity on this kind of distributions.
This characterization is substantially diﬀerent from others and in the next section we will discuss
the main diﬀerences. The main idea of the characterization is the following. An inequality index is a
real function with domain vectors of nonnegative real numbers. We impose four properties or axioms
directly on functions that represent potential inequality indexes. Our first two axioms are well known,
simple and natural. The first one, scale invariance, allows us to restrict the domain of the index to the
corresponding simplex. A second property, symmetry or anonymity, allows us to restrict our domain
even more; it would be suﬃcient to define the index on income distribution sets that remain invariant
the order among individuals and incomes. In other words, an income distribution and any ordering of
such distribution will maintain the same inequality value. Each possible increasing order is associated
to a specific type of permutation of individuals; all distributions with the same order form a very
special set in which we impose the remaining two axioms on it. The third axiom, proportionality,
serves to define the index at the extreme points of these special sets. In these extreme points, there
are only two possible values: zero or identical values with the characteristic that the total sum is
one. For the case of three individuals and a distribution with order 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3, the extreme
points are (13 13 13), (0 12 12) and (0 0 1). The proportionality axiom allows us to define the
inequality index in extreme points as the ratio formed by the number of individuals with no income
and the total number of individuals. Finally, the fourth axiom, convexity in similar rankings1 , serves
to extend linearly the inequality index, from the values generated by the proportionality axiom into
the corresponding special set, which represents ordered distributions with the same permutation.
Among the advantages of the characterization we note the following: it works very well for the
discrete case and is simple, the axioms are imposed directly on the indexes and not on welfare or-
derings induced by distributions, there is no need to appeal to axioms of rationality (completeness
and transitivity) and continuity to obtain numeric representations of welfare orderings. Moreover, a
simpler way to compute it is derived.
The Gini index has been used primarily as a tool for comparison of income distributions among
countries or geographical regions. At the same time, it is used as one of the most important indicators
to take into account for the allocation of public resources. For example, Sen (1973) suggests that the
comparison of welfare among diﬀerent countries is not limited to the valuation of GDP per capita, he
proposes to weigh the GDP by the degree of equality of the income distribution. Thus, between two
countries with the same per capita income, it is considered a better country the one with less inequality
in the distribution of resources. The Gini index is also used as one of the factors that explain poverty
(for instance, see Sen (1973) and Foster et al (1984)).
The coeﬃcient attributed to Gini (1912) has been presented and analyzed by Dalton (1920), Atkin-
son (1970) and Sen (1973), among others.
As is well known, the Gini index is constructed traditionally in two ways, both with roots from
statistical measures of dispersion: (1) the discrete version as an standardized average of all income
diﬀerences between individuals or groups and (2) the continuous version through the Lorenz curve. In
this last version, the Gini coeﬃcient is associated with the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45
degree diagonal line of the unit square. The Lorenz curve, () is a non-decreasing continuous function
with domain the unit interval, which measures the proportion of accumulated wealth from individuals
with the lowest income to the income accumulated in the  percent of the population, ordered from
lower to higher incomes and standardized in the unit interval. Two times the area enclosed between
() and the identity line is precisely the Gini coeﬃcient. When it is zero, there is no inequality
because the income would be distributed equally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After giving a short review of the related literature,
especially other characterizations, in Section 2, we recall the main basic features of the Gini index
in Section 3. Section 4 states the set of axioms which are required an inequality index to satisfy in
this work. Finally, Section 5 presents the main characterization theorem of the Gini index, which
1The precise definitions will be provided in Section 4.
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constitutes the main result of this work.
2 Related literature
The discrete formula of the Gini coeﬃcient as an standardized average of income diﬀerences is presented
in several equivalent versions, a good explanation is available in the classic paper of Sen (1973) or in the
survey of Dutta (2002). Atkinson (1970) provides the basis to discuss the relation between inequality
and social welfare orders. When an income distribution , presents a higher inequality than distribution
of income , the social welfare of the society with distribution  will be better than the social welfare
under the distribution . Where there is less inequality there will be less welfare. Atkinson proposes to
measure inequality from social welfare orders. To this end, it is enough to have an income distribution
associated with the indiﬀerent point of equal distribution, in the given order of social welfare, and
consider some distance away from such point. This will obviously depend on the fixed social welfare
order. The approach is quite ordinal and has constructed parameterized family of inequality indices,
coming from parameterized families of social evaluation functions.
Works like Weymark (1981), Donaldson and Weymark (1980), and Bossert (1990); present families
of social evaluation functions and the corresponding family of inequality indices. However, there is a
problem, two ordinally equivalent inequality indices, such as Gini and its square, can have associated
social welfare functions that are not ordinally convertible into each other. Works like Ebert (1987),
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984), Dutta and Esteban (1992), and Weymark (1999); present interesting
alternatives to link social welfare with inequality. In addition to the parameterized family of inequality
indices, there have been other attempts of characterization, among which are Mehran (1976), Kakwani
(1980), Pyatt (1976), Yitzhaki (1973), but have not been satisfactory enough.
A closer related work to the point of view presented in this paper is the one studied by Thon
(1982). This author proposes an axiomatization of the Gini coeﬃcient in a general case. He works in
a framework where income distributions whose aggregate incomes and populations are no necessarily
the same. Its axioms are imposed directly over the numerical function representing the inequality
index, as in our case. But the axioms used by Thon are essentially in a framework very diﬀerent
from the used in this paper. His axioms show us another properties of the Gini index, concerning
basically with asymptotic properties when the size of population with income distribution grows. In
our framework the size of population is fixed, we explore algebraic distribution properties instead of
asymptotic characteristics of the Gini coeﬃcient.
An axiomatization for the continuous version of the Gini index is provided in Aaberge (2001), it is
based on the imposition of axioms to characterize an order over Lorenz curves, viewed as lotteries of
the theory of choice under uncertainty. The axioms are almost the same as those that characterize the
VNM utilities. This axiomatization is mathematically elegant but requires some kind of complexity
greater than that proposed here for the discrete version. Our version does not require going through
a representation theorem. The axioms are imposed directly on inequality indices, defined in the real
-dimensional space.
The axiomatization of Weymark (1981), presenting the Gini coeﬃcient as an element of a parame-
terized family of inequality indices, his axioms generate social evaluation functions, i.e., representations
of social welfare orders, which are transformed into inequality indices through the Atkinson method-
ology. The author is forced to use the Pigou-Dalton principle to achieve the characterization of the
obtained family of indices. The characterization of Aaberge (2001), based on continuous Lorenz curves,
use axioms strongly that imply a numerical representation of an order. They impose axioms of tran-
sitivity, completeness, continuity and independence on the orders of preference distributions. Our
axioms are imposed directly on inequality indicators defined in a real -dimensional space.
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3 Framework and notation
In this section we give some concepts and notation related to mathematical symbols and a brief part
of preliminaries of the Gini index.
The Gini index can be used to measure the dispersion of a distribution of income, or consumption,
or wealth, or a distribution of any other kinds. But the kind of distributions where the Gini index is
used most is the distribution of income. For this reason, and for simplicity, this paper will focus on
the Gini index in the context of income distributions although its applications should not be limited
to income distributions. For simplicity, the discussion in this paper is based on income distributions
of the individuals within the population.
There are generally two diﬀerent approaches for analyzing theoretical results of the Gini index:
one is based on discrete distributions; the other on continuous distributions. The latter demands
certain conditions on continuity while the former does not require such condition. The discrete income
distribution is easy to understand in some cases while the continuous income distribution can simplify
some derivations in some situations.
Let  = {1 2  } be a set of individuals. When the income distribution function is discrete,
such incomes take  values that can be denoted by a vector  ∈ R+, where  denotes the income for
the agent .
For a given  ∈ R+, let ∗ denote the the vector obtained from  by arranging its coordinates
in non-decreasing order (∗1 ≤ ∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ ∗). For example, if  = (9 7 0 11 3 5 9 0) then ∗ =
(0 0 3 5 7 9 9 11).
Now, the group of permutations of  ,  = { :  →  |  is bijective} acts on the space of
income vectors R+ in a natural way; i.e., for  ∈  and  ∈ R+:
 · (1 2     ) = ((1) (2)     ())2
Notice that for an arbitrary  ∈ R+, there exists at least one permutation  such that  ·  = ∗.
Let   ∈ R+ be two income distributions. We say that  and  provide the same ranking if there
exists  ∈  such that  · = ∗ and  · = ∗. In other words, two income distributions give the same
ranking if the income position for every agent is the same in both orderings ∗ and ∗. For example,
the income distributions  = (6 0 3 18 1 24) and  = (11 5 10 19 7 33) give the same ranking; since
for both distributions, agent 2 is the poorest one, agent 5 is the second poorest, agent 6 is the richest
one, and so on.
In general, an inequality index is a function  : R+ → R that assigns to each income vector a real
number, which represents the society’s inequality level.
The attractiveness of the Gini index to many economists is that it has an intuitive geometric
interpretation. That is, the Gini index can be defined geometrically as the ratio of the area that lies
between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve (which plots the proportion of the total
income of the population that is cumulatively earned by the bottom of the population), over the total
area under the line of equality.
Several alternative formulations in fact follow the same tradition. Sen (1973) defined the Gini index
as a function  : R+ → R such that
() = 1
∙
+ 1− 2
P
=1(+ 1− )∗P
=1 ∗
¸
(1)
This formulation illustrates that the income-rank-based weights are inversely associated with the
sizes of incomes. That is, in the index the richer’s incomes get lower weights while the poor’s income
get higher weights.
2This permutation implies a change of position of the individuals within the income distribution.
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Example 1 Let the hypothetical income distribution be  = (30 20 60 10), then ∗ = (10 20 30 60)
and
() = 1
4
∙
5− 24(10) + 3(20) + 2(30) + 1(60)
120
¸
=
1
3
This paper will show that the Gini index given by the above formulation is uniquely determined
by a certain set of properties, described in the next section.
4 The axioms
Next, we define a set of axioms which are required an inequality index to satisfy in this work.
The first axiom deals with scales; that is, scaling the incomes  by a constant factor causes nothing
to the inequality index. So, if the income is measured in other currencies, then the index remains the
same.
Axiom 2 (Scale invariance) The inequality index  is said to be scale-invariant if
() = ()
for all  ∈ R+ and 0 6=  ∈ R.
The next axiom requires that the inequality index be independent of any characteristic of the
individuals other than income . Formally,
Axiom 3 (Symmetry) The inequality index  is symmetric if and only if
( · ) = ()
for every  ∈  and  ∈ R+.
Now, consider a society where there are only two types of individuals: rich people with 1 unit
of income and the poor people with no income. The next property establishes that for this kind of
societies, the inequality index is defined in direct proportion of the number of individuals with no
income. Without loss of generality; for  ∈ N, let  = (0    0| {z }

 1     1| {z }
−
) be the income vector of such
society.
Axiom 4 (Proportionality) The inequality index  is said to be proportional if
() = 
According to the previous axiom, notice that a proportional index gives (1     1) = 0 and
(0    0 1) = −1 .
Finally, the next property is a technical requirement referred to a couple of income distributions
that provide the same ranking. Further suppose that these two distributions have the same total
income. The fourth axiom requires that the index of the convex combination of such distributions is
exactly the convex combination of the index of each one.
Axiom 5 (Convexity in similar rankings) 3The inequality index  is convex in similar rankings
if
 [+ (1− )] = () + (1− )()
for every  ∈ [0 1], every   ∈ R+ that provides the same ranking and P=1  =P=1 .
3We will abbreviate it by ’Convexity’.
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5 The main result
This section is devoted to a characterization of the Gini index by means of the previous axioms, which
establishes the main result of this work. But first of all, we shall present some results that are used in
the characterization.
The key idea is to show that the four axioms characterize the Gini index on the convex set
 =
(
 ∈ R+ |
X
=1
 = 1 and 1 ≤ 2 ≤ · · · ≤ 
)
4
and so, it will be characterized on the whole space of income vectors R+. As it is shown in:
Lemma 6 Let  : R+ → R be a symmetric and scale-invariant index. If  is defined on , then it is
defined on R+.
Proof. If  ∈ R+, then there exists  ∈  such that (1) ≤ (2) ≤ · · · ≤ () and hence
1=1  ( · ) ∈ . Therefore,

∙
1P
=1  ( · )
¸
= ( · ) = ()
As we will see, each element of  may be expressed as a convex combination of the vectors {}=1;
which are actually the extreme points of 5 and they are given by
 =
½ 1
−+1 if  ≤ 
0 otherwise
(2)
Lemma 7 For every  ∈ , there exist unique non-negative scalars {}=1, such that
P
=1  = 1
and
 =
X
=1
 (3)
Moreover, the scalars are given by
 = (−  + 1)( − −1)
for  = 1 2    , where 0 = 0.
Proof. Let  be a × matrix with entries  =  , and let  be the 1× matrix  = [1 2 · · ·] . Notice that  =P=1  can be represented by the system of equations  =  . Since  is
non-singular, then the scalars {}=1 are unique.
Now, for arbitrary  ∈ :
X
=1
 =
X
=1
(−  + 1)( − −1) 1−  + 1
=
X
=1
 −
X
=1
−1 = 
4Note that if  ∈ , then ∗ = .
5 Since we can easily verify that each  is a vector in  and does not lie in any open line segment joining two vectors
of .
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For the other direction:
 − −1 =
X
=1
 −
X
=1
−1 =
X
=1

−  + 1 −
−1X
=1

−  + 1
=

− + 1
Hence,
 = (− + 1) ( − −1)
and they are not negative since  ∈ .
Finally, those scalars add up 1:
X
=1
 =
X
=1
(−  + 1)( − −1)
=
X
=1
(−  + 1) −
−1X
=0
(− )
=
X
=1
 = 1
Lemma 8 Let  ∈ ,  = 1      and  ≥ 0 be such that P=1  = 1. If  : R+ → R is a convex
index, then

⎛
⎝
X
=1

⎞
⎠ =
X
=1
()
Proof. First, it is clear that every pair of elements in  provides the same ranking, since by definition
they all are ordered increasingly.
The proof is done by induction on . Assume that the statement holds for  ∈ N:

⎛
⎝
X
=1

⎞
⎠ =
X
=1
()
for  ∈ ,  = 1      and  ≥ 0 are such that P=1  = 1.
Now, let  ∈ ,  = 1      + 1 and let  ≥ 0 be such that P+1=1  = 1. Since  is a convex
index:

⎛
⎝
+1X
=1

⎞
⎠ = 
⎛
⎝
X
=1
 + +1+1
⎞
⎠
= (1− +1)
⎛
⎝
X
=1

1− +1

⎞
⎠+ +1(+1)
Notice that

1−+1 ≥ 0 and
P
=1

1−+1 = 1. Thus, by the induction hypothesis:

⎛
⎝
+1X
=1

⎞
⎠ = (1− +1)
X
=1

1− +1 (
) + +1(+1)
=
+1X
=1
()
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Remark 9 Note that the scale invariance and proportionality determines an inequality index on the
extreme points of , whereas the symmetry and convexity in similar rankings determines the index on
the interior of .
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 10 Let  : R+ → R. Then,  equals the Gini index, given by (1), if and only if it satisfies
scale invariance, symmetry, proportionality and convexity axioms.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the Gini index given by (1) satisfies the four properties.
For the converse, let  : R+ → R be any index satisfying the four axioms and let  ∈ R+ be
an income vector. Define  =  · , where  ∈  is such that  ·  = ∗ and set  = =1  .
It is clear that  ∈  and so, it can be decomposed as  = P=1  for unique real numbersn
 ≥ 0 |P=1  = 1o=1.
Thus, using the symmetry and scale invariance axioms, and Lemma 7:
() = ( · ) = () = 
Ã
1P
=1  
!
= () = 
Ã X
=1

!
Next, by Lemmas 7 and 8:
() =
X
=1
() =
X
=1
(− + 1)( − −1)()
It is easy to verify that () = −1 , by the scale-invariance and proportionality of . Therefore, we
obtain:
() =
X
=1
(− + 1)( − −1) − 1
=
X
=1
(− + 1) (− 1)
  −
X
=2
(− + 1) (− 1)
 −1
=
X
=1
(− + 1) (− 1)
  −
−1X
=1
(− )
 
=
− 1
  +
−1X
=1
∙
(− + 1) (− 1)
 −
(− )

¸

=
− 1
  +
−1X
=1
2− − 1
  =
X
=1
2− − 1
 
=
1

"
−− 1 + 2
X
=1

#
=
1

"
−− 1 + 2
X
=1

Ã
P
=1 
!#
=
1

"
+ 1− 2
P
=1(+ 1− )P
=1 
#
=
1

"
+ 1− 2
P
=1(+ 1− )∗P
=1 ∗
#
= ()
which coincides with (1).
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Example 11 As an illustration of the above derivation (and using the same notation), we compute
the Gini index as Example 1.
For the income distribution  = (30 20 60 10) ⇒  = ¡ 112  16  14  12¢. Furthermore,
 =
µ
1
12
 1
6
 1
4
 1
2
¶
=
1
3
1 + 1
4
2 + 1
6
3 + 1
4
4
=
1
3
µ
1
4
 1
4
 1
4
 1
4
¶
+
1
4
µ
0 1
3
 1
3
 1
3
¶
+
1
6
µ
0 0 1
2
 1
2
¶
+
1
4
(0 0 0 1)
and hence,
() = () = 1
3
 ¡1¢+ 1
4
 ¡2¢+ 1
6
 ¡3¢+ 1
4
 ¡4¢
=
1
3
(0) +
1
4
µ
1
4
¶
+
1
6
µ
1
2
¶
+
1
4
µ
3
4
¶
=
1
3
Remark 12 From the proof of the previous Theorem, a simpler way to calculate the Gini index is
derived. That is, for an arbitrary income vector  ∈ R+, it is shown that the Gini index is obtained
from
() =
X
=1
 (4)
where  = 2−−1 and  = 
∗=1 ∗ .
In order to compute the coeﬃcients {}=1, it is suﬃcient to calculate half of them, since the
relation + +1− = 0 holds for every  = 1 2    . When  is an odd number, it turns out that the
central coeﬃcient  +1
2
vanishes.
Example 13 Let us give the precise values of coeﬃcients  for the case  = 7:
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 −67 −47 −27 0 27 47 67
Example 14 As a final example, we present the computation of the Gini index from expression (4)
for the income distribution  = (75 5 10 20 6 58 6).
According to the previous discussion,  = ¡ 136  130  130  118  19  2990  512¢ and we then get:
() = −6
7
µ
1
36
¶
− 4
7
µ
1
30
¶
− 2
7
µ
1
30
¶
+
2
7
µ
1
9
¶
+
4
7
µ
29
90
¶
+
6
7
µ
5
12
¶
=
164
315
≈ 05206
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